Lesson 1 of 6·21 min read·Includes quiz

Log Sources That Matter

The 8 log source categories every SOC monitors: Windows Event Logs, Linux/Syslog, firewall, DNS, web proxy, email gateway, cloud audit trails, and application logs

What You'll Learn

  • Identify the 8 log source categories that feed a production SIEM
  • Understand what each category tells you and which attack phases it covers
  • Know the critical Windows Event IDs every SOC analyst must recognize on sight
  • Explain what Linux log files reveal about system and user activity
  • Map log sources to MITRE ATT&CK tactics to understand where your visibility starts and stops
  • Recognize log source gaps and why no single source is enough

Why Log Sources Are Everything

In Module 1, you learned that a SIEM is the central nervous system of the SOC. But a SIEM is only as good as the data flowing into it. If a log source isn't connected, the SIEM can't see it — and neither can you. Every blind spot in your log coverage is an opportunity for an attacker to operate undetected.

In Lab 1.3, you explored 10 log sources inside Wazuh and built a Log Source Reference Sheet. Now we're going to expand that foundation. A real enterprise SOC doesn't monitor 10 sources — it monitors hundreds, organized into 8 major categories. Understanding these categories is what separates a junior analyst who reacts to alerts from a senior analyst who understands the full picture.

The #1 question every SOC analyst should ask on day one: "What log sources do we have — and what are we missing?"

8 Log Source Categories in the SOC


Category 1: Windows Event Logs

Windows Event Logs are the single most important log source in most enterprise SOCs because the vast majority of corporate endpoints and servers run Windows. The Windows Security channel alone generates the events you'll spend 60-70% of your time investigating.

Windows Event IDs — The Essential Cheat Sheet

The Must-Know Event IDs

Event IDChannelWhat It LogsATT&CK Relevance
4624SecuritySuccessful logonLateral movement (T1021), valid accounts (T1078)
4625SecurityFailed logonBrute force (T1110), password spraying
4688SecurityNew process createdExecution (T1059), command-line logging
4697SecurityService installedPersistence (T1543.003)
4720SecurityUser account createdAccount manipulation (T1136)
7045SystemNew service registeredPersistence (T1543.003) — duplicate coverage with 4697
1102SecurityAudit log clearedDefense evasion (T1070.001) — always critical
4648SecurityExplicit credential logonCredential use — runas, scheduled tasks
4672SecuritySpecial privileges assignedAdmin logon — tracks who got elevated access

Logon Types — The Context That Changes Everything

When you see Event ID 4624 or 4625, the logon type field tells you how the authentication happened. This single field can mean the difference between a routine event and an active intrusion:

TypeNameWhat It MeansSuspicious When...
2InteractiveKeyboard login at the consoleHappens outside business hours on a server
3NetworkSMB, RPC, WMI — remote resource accessSource IP is external or from an unexpected subnet
5ServiceWindows service startingNormal — unless it's a service you didn't install
7UnlockWorkstation unlockedRarely suspicious on its own
10RemoteInteractiveRDP sessionSource IP is external, or user doesn't normally RDP

Type 3 (Network) Is Where Lateral Movement Lives. When an attacker uses stolen credentials to access file shares (SMB), run commands via WMI, or execute PsExec, it generates a Type 3 logon. If you see Type 3 from an unusual source IP — especially hopping between servers — that's your lateral movement indicator.

What Windows Event Logs Don't Tell You

Windows Security logs are powerful, but they have blind spots:

  • No command-line arguments in 4688 unless you enable "Include command line in process creation events" via Group Policy
  • No DLL loading, registry changes, or network connections per process — that's what Sysmon adds (Lesson 2.6)
  • No file content analysis — you know a file was created but not what's in it (that's YARA, Module 7)

Category 2: Linux / Syslog

Linux systems generate logs through the syslog facility and dedicated log files. In a SOC, you'll encounter Linux logs from web servers, DNS servers, database servers, network appliances, and cloud instances.

The Critical Log Files

Log FileWhat It ContainsSOC Relevance
/var/log/auth.log (Debian/Ubuntu) or /var/log/secure (RHEL/CentOS)SSH logins, sudo commands, PAM authenticationBrute force (T1110), privilege escalation (T1548), valid accounts (T1078)
/var/log/syslog or /var/log/messagesSystem events, service starts/stops, kernel messagesPersistence (cron, services), system manipulation
/var/log/audit/audit.logDetailed audit trail (if auditd is enabled)Process execution, file access, syscalls — Linux's equivalent of deep telemetry
/var/log/cronCron job executionPersistence via scheduled tasks (T1053.003)
/var/log/kern.logKernel-level messagesFirewall drops (iptables), hardware issues, kernel exploits

Reading auth.log — What Matters

A single SSH brute force attempt in auth.log looks like this:

Feb 15 06:15:02 linux-web-01 sshd[5102]: Invalid user admin from 185.220.101.42 port 44891
Feb 15 06:15:14 linux-web-01 sshd[5104]: Failed password for root from 185.220.101.42 port 44903

The fields that matter for triage:

  • Timestamp — when did it happen?
  • Hostname — which server was targeted?
  • Program — sshd, sudo, cron, etc.
  • Source IP — internal (expected) or external (investigate)?
  • Username — valid user or random guess?

Linux Audit Framework (auditd)

When auditd is enabled, it provides the deepest Linux visibility — comparable to what Sysmon gives on Windows. It can log:

  • Every process execution with full command lines
  • File access and permission changes
  • Network socket creation
  • System calls

Most production Linux servers in security-conscious organizations run auditd. If you see /var/log/audit/audit.log events in your SIEM, you have premium Linux visibility.

💡

Career Note: Many SOC job postings list "experience with Linux log analysis" as a requirement. What they really mean is: can you read auth.log, understand sudo events, and spot anomalies in syslog? Lab 1.3 already gave you hands-on practice with exactly this.


Category 3: Firewall & Network Device Logs

Firewalls sit at network boundaries and log every connection they allow or block. They're your perimeter visibility — the first and last line of defense.

What Firewall Logs Contain

FieldWhat It Tells You
Source IPWho initiated the connection
Destination IPWhat internal system they targeted
Destination PortWhat service they tried to reach (22=SSH, 443=HTTPS, 3389=RDP)
ActionAllow or deny/drop
ProtocolTCP, UDP, ICMP
Bytes transferredVolume of data (relevant for exfiltration)

Common Firewall Platforms You'll Encounter

PlatformLog FormatHow It Reaches the SIEM
iptables/nftables (Linux)Kernel syslog messagesSyslog forwarding
Palo Alto NetworksStructured CSV or CEFSyslog or API integration
Fortinet FortiGateKey-value pairsSyslog forwarding
Cisco ASASyslog with message codesSyslog forwarding
pfSenseBSD syslog formatSyslog forwarding
AWS Security Groups / NACLsVPC Flow Logs (JSON)CloudWatch → SIEM connector

What to Look For

  • Repeated drops to the same port from one IP — port scanning (reconnaissance)
  • Drops on port 4444, 5555, or other non-standard ports — reverse shell attempts
  • Allowed connections to known-bad IPs — C2 communication that got through
  • Large outbound data transfers — potential exfiltration
  • Internal-to-internal drops — misconfiguration or lateral movement attempts

Firewall Logs Show You What Was Blocked — And What Got Through. A "deny" event means the attack was stopped at the perimeter. An "allow" to a suspicious destination means it wasn't. Both are equally important: denies tell you who's knocking, allows tell you who got in.


Category 4: DNS Query Logs

Every network connection starts with a DNS query. Before malware can call home to evil-c2.example.com, it has to resolve that domain to an IP address. DNS logs capture every one of these queries.

Why DNS Logs Are a SOC Goldmine

  1. C2 Detection — Malware must resolve its C2 domain. DNS logs record it even if the actual C2 traffic is encrypted.
  2. DNS Tunneling — Attackers encode data inside DNS queries to exfiltrate information. These show up as unusually long subdomains or high query volumes to a single domain.
  3. DGA Detection — Domain Generation Algorithms produce random-looking domains (xk7gf2p9.net). A spike in queries to newly-registered or algorithmically-generated domains is a strong malware indicator.
  4. Shadow IT Discovery — DNS logs reveal what cloud services employees are using (Dropbox, personal email, unauthorized SaaS).

What DNS Log Fields Matter

FieldWhat It Tells You
Client IPWhich internal host made the query
Queried domainWhat they tried to resolve
Query typeA (IPv4), AAAA (IPv6), MX (mail), TXT (often used for tunneling)
Response codeNOERROR (found), NXDOMAIN (doesn't exist), SERVFAIL
TimestampWhen the query happened

Suspicious DNS Patterns

PatternWhat It May Indicate
Queries to domains with random charactersDGA malware (T1568.002)
Very long subdomain strings (50+ chars)DNS tunneling / exfiltration (T1071.004)
High volume of NXDOMAIN responsesDGA probing or misconfigured malware
Queries to recently registered domains (< 30 days)Newly staged C2 infrastructure
TXT record queries to unusual domainsDNS-based data exfiltration
🚨

DNS Never Lies. An attacker can encrypt their C2 traffic, use legitimate cloud services for hosting, and blend into normal HTTPS traffic. But they can't avoid DNS resolution (unless they hardcode IPs, which limits flexibility). This makes DNS one of the most reliable detection sources across the entire kill chain.


Category 5: Web Proxy / HTTP Logs

A web proxy (also called a Secure Web Gateway) sits between users and the internet. It inspects, logs, and optionally blocks web traffic. In organizations that route all web traffic through a proxy, these logs are a treasure trove.

What Proxy Logs Capture

FieldWhat It Tells You
User / Client IPWho made the request
URLFull URL including path and parameters
HTTP MethodGET, POST, PUT, DELETE
Response Code200 (OK), 403 (blocked), 404 (not found), 500 (server error)
Content TypeWas it HTML, JavaScript, an executable, a ZIP file?
User-AgentWhat browser or tool made the request
Bytes transferredHow much data was uploaded or downloaded
CategoryProxy's classification (business, social media, malware, uncategorized)

SOC Use Cases

  • Malware delivery detection — User visited a compromised website, proxy logged the URL and the .exe download
  • C2 callback identification — Infected host makes periodic HTTPS connections to cdn-static-assets.xyz every 60 seconds
  • Data exfiltration — Large POST requests to an uncategorized domain at 3 AM
  • Policy violation — Employee accessing unauthorized file-sharing or personal cloud storage
  • Phishing follow-through — After clicking a link in email, what did they actually browse to?

Common Proxy Platforms

PlatformDeploymentNotes
ZscalerCloud-basedVery common in modern enterprises
Symantec/BlueCoat ProxySGOn-prem applianceLegacy but still widespread
SquidOpen-source, on-premOften used in smaller orgs
McAfee Web GatewayOn-prem or cloudEnterprise-grade
Microsoft Defender for Cloud AppsCloud (M365)CASB functionality
💡

Proxy + DNS = Network Visibility Duo. DNS tells you what domains were resolved. Proxy tells you what content was actually accessed. Together, they give you near-complete visibility into outbound network activity — even when the traffic is encrypted (because the proxy terminates TLS).


Category 6: Email Gateway Logs

Phishing remains the #1 initial access vector in real-world attacks. In Lab 1.2, the APT29 scenario started with spearphishing emails (T1566.001). Email gateway logs are where you detect and investigate these attacks.

What Email Gateway Logs Capture

FieldWhat It Tells You
Sender addressWho sent the email (and whether it's spoofed)
RecipientWho was targeted
Subject lineSocial engineering context
Attachment name / typeinvoice.docm, urgent-review.pdf.exe
URLs in bodyPhishing links, credential harvester URLs
VerdictDelivered, quarantined, blocked
SPF/DKIM/DMARC resultsEmail authentication — did it pass?
Threat classificationPhishing, malware, spam, BEC

Why Email Logs Are Critical for Investigation

When a phishing campaign hits your organization, the SIEM alert might only show one user who clicked. Email gateway logs answer the harder questions:

  1. How many people received the same email? (scope of the campaign)
  2. Did anyone else click the link or open the attachment? (other potential victims)
  3. Was the email quarantined or delivered? (do you need to pull it from mailboxes?)
  4. What was the sender domain and IP? (IOCs for threat intel — Module 5)

Common Email Security Platforms

PlatformTypeNotes
Microsoft Defender for Office 365Cloud (M365)Built into most enterprise email
ProofpointCloud gatewayMarket leader in email security
MimecastCloud gatewayStrong attachment sandboxing
BarracudaCloud/on-premMid-market
Google Workspace SecurityCloud (Gmail)Built into Google Workspace

The Gap Between "Blocked" and "Delivered." An email gateway might block 99% of phishing attempts. That sounds great until you realize that in a 10,000-employee organization receiving 1,000 phishing emails per day, "99% blocked" means 10 phishing emails land in inboxes every single day. Those 10 are why SOC analysts exist.


Category 7: Cloud Audit Trails

Modern organizations run hybrid environments — on-premises servers plus cloud infrastructure (AWS, Azure, GCP) plus SaaS applications (M365, Salesforce, Slack). Each of these generates audit logs that track who did what.

The Big Three Cloud Audit Sources

SourcePlatformWhat It Logs
AWS CloudTrailAWSEvery API call — EC2 launches, S3 access, IAM changes, console logins
Azure AD / Entra ID Sign-in LogsMicrosoftUser sign-ins, MFA challenges, conditional access results, risky sign-ins
Microsoft 365 Unified Audit LogM365Email access, SharePoint file operations, Teams activity, admin changes
Google Workspace AuditGoogleGmail access, Drive sharing, admin console changes
GCP Cloud Audit LogsGCPAdmin activity, data access, system events

Why Cloud Logs Matter More Every Year

  • Identity is the new perimeter. In cloud environments, there's no firewall between the attacker and your data — just an identity (username + password + MFA). Cloud audit logs track every authentication and authorization decision.
  • Attackers target cloud directly. Credential stuffing against Azure AD, phishing for M365 tokens, compromising AWS access keys — these attacks skip your on-prem defenses entirely.
  • Data lives in the cloud. If an attacker exfiltrates data from SharePoint or S3, the only log that records it is the cloud audit trail.

Key Cloud Events to Monitor

EventPlatformWhy It Matters
Console login from unusual locationAWS CloudTrail / Azure ADCompromised credentials (T1078.004)
MFA bypass or disabledAzure AD / M365Attacker removing security controls
IAM policy changedAWS CloudTrailPrivilege escalation in cloud (T1098)
S3 bucket made publicAWS CloudTrailData exposure — accidental or malicious
Mail forwarding rule createdM365Business Email Compromise (BEC) persistence
Mass file download from SharePointM365Data exfiltration (T1530)

Cloud Logs Are the Fastest Growing Category. Five years ago, most SOCs monitored only on-prem logs. Today, cloud audit trails often generate more events than traditional sources. In some cloud-native organizations, CloudTrail and Azure AD logs are the primary data sources in the SIEM.


Category 8: Application & Database Logs

Every application generates logs — web servers, databases, custom business applications, middleware. These logs are often overlooked in SOCs but contain evidence that no other source captures.

Web Server Logs

SourceLog FileWhat It Records
Apacheaccess.log, error.logEvery HTTP request: IP, URL, method, status code, user-agent
Nginxaccess.log, error.logSame as Apache with different format
IISW3SVC logsWindows web server access logs

Web server logs detect:

  • SQL injection attempts/api/users?id=1' OR '1'='1 (T1190)
  • Web shell access — Repeated requests to /uploads/shell.php from a single IP
  • Directory traversal/../../etc/passwd in URL paths
  • Vulnerability scanning — Rapid requests to known vulnerable paths (/wp-login.php, /phpmyadmin, /.env)

Database Audit Logs

DatabaseAudit FeatureWhat It Records
MySQL / MariaDBGeneral query log, audit pluginEvery SQL query executed
PostgreSQLpgaudit extensionQuery logging with parameters
MSSQLSQL Server AuditLogin events, schema changes, query execution
OracleUnified AuditingComprehensive query and access logging

Database audit logs detect:

  • Unauthorized data access — SELECT queries on sensitive tables from unusual users
  • Data manipulation — UPDATE/DELETE on critical records
  • Schema changes — DROP TABLE, ALTER TABLE from non-admin accounts
  • Privilege escalation — GRANT commands giving excessive permissions

Custom Application Logs

Many organizations build custom applications that generate their own logs. These often contain business-context that no other log source provides:

  • Authentication events specific to the application
  • Business logic violations (e.g., transferring more than a threshold amount)
  • API access patterns that indicate scraping or abuse
💡

The Overlooked Goldmine. Web server logs are available on virtually every organization's web-facing systems but are often not forwarded to the SIEM. If you join a SOC and discover that Apache/Nginx access logs aren't being collected, flag it immediately — you're blind to web application attacks.


Connecting Log Sources to ATT&CK

In Lab 1.2, you mapped 15 APT29 techniques to the ATT&CK framework and color-coded them by detection capability. Now let's see which log sources cover which tactics:

Log Sources Mapped to ATT&CK Tactics

ATT&CK TacticPrimary Log SourcesWhy
Initial AccessEmail gateway, web proxy, firewallPhishing emails, drive-by downloads, and exploit attempts arrive through these channels
ExecutionWindows 4688, Linux audit.log, application logsProcess creation captures what ran; app logs capture web-based execution
PersistenceWindows 7045/4697, Linux syslog/cron, cloud auditNew services, scheduled tasks, and IAM changes establish long-term access
Defense EvasionWindows events, cloud audit, FIMLog clearing (1102), policy changes, and file modifications reveal evasion attempts
Credential AccessWindows 4625, Linux auth.log, cloud sign-in logsFailed authentication across all platforms tracks brute force and credential theft
DiscoveryDNS logs, Windows events, cloud auditNetwork reconnaissance generates DNS queries and enumeration events
Lateral MovementWindows 4624 (Type 3), firewall logsNetwork logons between internal systems and allowed internal traffic patterns
ExfiltrationWeb proxy, DNS logs, firewall logsOutbound data transfers, DNS tunneling, and large file uploads to external services
🚨

No Single Log Source Covers the Full Kill Chain. This is the most important takeaway of this lesson. Windows Event Logs alone miss initial access (email), network C2 (DNS/proxy), and cloud attacks entirely. A SOC that only monitors Windows events has massive blind spots. Defense in depth requires log sources in depth.


The Log Source Priority Matrix

Not every log source is equally important. If you're building a SOC from scratch or evaluating coverage, here's how to prioritize:

PriorityLog SourcesWhy First
Tier 1 — Must HaveWindows Security Events, Linux auth.log, Firewall logs, DNS logsThese cover authentication, process execution, network boundaries, and name resolution — the four pillars of visibility
Tier 2 — High ValueEmail gateway, Web proxy, Cloud audit trails (Azure AD / CloudTrail)These cover the top initial access vector (email), outbound traffic inspection, and cloud identity — where modern attacks happen
Tier 3 — Deep VisibilitySysmon (Lesson 2.6), Application logs, Database audit, Endpoint telemetry (EDR)These provide the deep technical detail needed for advanced investigation and threat hunting

What Happens When a Log Source Is Missing

Missing SourceWhat You Can't See
No email gateway logsPhishing campaigns, BEC, malicious attachments — you only find out after the user clicks
No web proxy logsC2 callbacks, malware downloads, data exfiltration over HTTPS
No DNS logsDNS tunneling, DGA activity, C2 domain resolution
No cloud audit logsCompromised cloud accounts, unauthorized data access, shadow IT
No process creation (4688)What programs ran on compromised systems — you see the login but not what happened after

Practical Application: Your Lab Environment

In Lab 1.3, you worked with events from 4 agents covering 10 log sources. Here's how they map to the 8 categories you just learned:

CategoryCovered in Lab?AgentWhat You Saw
Windows Event LogsYesWIN-SERVER-014624, 4625, 4688, 7045
Linux / SyslogYeslinux-web-01SSH auth, sudo, audit
Firewall & NetworkYesfw-edge-01iptables drop events
DNS Query LogsYesdns-server-01Named query logs
Web Proxy / HTTPPartiallinux-web-01Apache access logs (web server, not proxy)
Email GatewayNoNot in lab environment
Cloud Audit TrailsNoNot in lab environment
Application & DBPartiallinux-web-01Apache access/error logs

The gaps are intentional — email gateway and cloud audit logs require enterprise infrastructure that doesn't fit in a lab container. But now you know they exist and what they provide, so when you encounter them in a real SOC, you'll understand their value immediately.

Key Takeaways

  • A SIEM monitors 8 categories of log sources: Windows Events, Linux/Syslog, Firewall, DNS, Web Proxy, Email Gateway, Cloud Audit Trails, and Application/Database logs
  • Windows Event IDs 4624, 4625, 4688, 7045, and 1102 are the five you must recognize on sight — they cover authentication, process execution, persistence, and anti-forensics
  • Logon Type in Windows 4624/4625 events tells you how the authentication happened — Type 3 (Network) is where lateral movement lives
  • DNS logs are one of the most reliable detection sources because attackers cannot avoid DNS resolution
  • Email gateway logs are critical because phishing remains the #1 initial access vector
  • Cloud audit trails are the fastest-growing log category as organizations move to hybrid and cloud-first architectures
  • No single log source covers the full ATT&CK kill chain — defense in depth requires log sources in depth
  • Your first question on day one of a new SOC job: "What log sources are we collecting — and what gaps do we have?"

What's Next

You now understand what data flows into a SIEM. In Lesson 2.2 — Anatomy of a SIEM Alert, you'll learn what happens after the data arrives: how Wazuh rules turn raw log events into the alerts you investigate, and how to read every field in an alert quickly and accurately.

Knowledge Check: Log Sources That Matter

10 questions · 70% to pass

1

How many log source categories does a production SIEM typically monitor?

2

A SOC analyst sees Windows Event ID 4625 with Logon Type 3 from an external IP address. What does this indicate?

3

Why are DNS query logs considered one of the most reliable detection sources for C2 communication?

4

What critical limitation of Windows Security Event Logs requires Sysmon to address?

5

An analyst notices a spike in DNS TXT record queries from a single host to an unusual domain with very long subdomain strings. What does this most likely indicate?

6

Why is 'no single log source covers the full kill chain' the most important takeaway about log sources?

7

Which log source would reveal that an attacker created a mail forwarding rule to maintain access to a compromised email account (BEC persistence)?

8

In Lab 1.3, you explored events from 4 Wazuh agents covering 10 log sources. Which of the following agents was responsible for SSH authentication and sudo events in the lab environment?

9

In Lab 1.3, you identified that email gateway and cloud audit trail logs were NOT present in the lab environment. Why is this gap significant for a production SOC?

10

In Lab 1.3, the fw-edge-01 agent generated iptables drop events. When you saw repeated drops to port 22 from a single external IP, which attack pattern were you observing?

0/10 answered